It could have been me:Proximity motivates disaster giving by Zagefka, Hanna
Proximity and disaster giving 1 
 
 
It could have been me:  
Proximity motivates disaster giving  
 
 
Hanna Zagefka 
Royal Holloway University of London 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4940 words including everything (3734 main text only) 
 
 
 
 
Contact:  
Dr Hanna Zagefka 
Royal Holloway University of London 
Egham, TW20 0QX 
United Kingdom 
Hanna.Zagefka@rhul.ac.uk 
Proximity and disaster giving 2 
 
Abstract 
Effects of physical proximity of potential donors to a disaster location were studied. Physical 
proximity increased counterfactual thoughts, i.e. thoughts that the donors themselves might 
have suffered from the event if the circumstances had been a bit different. Counterfactuals, in 
turn, increased reported willingness to help the victims of the disaster. The same effects were 
found for hypothetical proximity, in the form of a desire to visit the impacted location before 
the disaster occurred. The pattern was consistent across five correlational and experimental 
studies, which focused on a range of real-life and fictitious disasters. The findings are 
important because they can explain why people and governments often dwell on relatively 
minor problems at home rather than thousands of people suffering and dying overseas. The 
findings also suggest an easy and cost-effective way of boosting donations to disaster victims.  
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Would it be morally defensible to not save a drowning child because wading in the water 
would mean you will get your favorite shoes wet? Philosopher Peter Singer (2009) was glad 
to find that most people disagree. Why then, he wondered, do people not feel the same moral 
obligation to save a child who is dying on the other side of the world, if a small donations – 
amounting to less than the price of a shoe – can save a life? This paper shows that physical 
proximity to people in need encourages helping via counterfactual thoughts. If a terrible event 
causes suffering in a location proximal to us, we are more cognizant of the fact that we 
ourselves might have suffered from the event if the circumstances had been a bit different. 
This, in turn, motivates donations. What is more, the present findings show that actual 
physical proximity is not necessary to trigger such counterfactual thoughts. Hypothetical 
proximity, whereby potential donors reflect on the fact that they might have wanted to visit 
the location before the disaster, is sufficient for triggering donation-eliciting counterfactual 
thoughts. This is an important insight, because it suggests one very simple and cost-efficient 
way in which donations to disaster appeals can be boosted. As such, the present data can 
explain firstly why people often seem indifferent to disaster victims in faraway places, and it 
secondly points to an important strategy for addressing this indifference.  
 Counterfactual thoughts are cognitions about what might have been (Roese & Olson, 
1995); they are thoughts about alternatives to events. Counterfactuals are very common 
(Wong, Galinsky, & Kray, 2009), and they play a role when evaluating behavior and 
experiences of the self (De Brigard, Szpunar, & Schacter, 2013) and of others (Newman & 
Cain, 2014). They have been shown to be related to affect (Zeelenberg et al., 1998), 
cognitions (Olson & Roese, 2002), and behavioral choices (Epstude & Roese, 2008). We are 
specifically interested in the effects of potential donors feeling that they themselves could 
have suffered from a negative event if the circumstances had been a bit different. This is a 
‘close counterfactual’ (Kahneman & Varey, 1990), which concerns an event which almost 
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occurred. Counterfactual thoughts are particularly frequent in response to negative 
(Kahneman & Miller, 1986) and unexpected (Markman et al., 1993) events. Since disasters 
are usually both negative and unexpected – if they had been expected they might have been 
prevented – one might expect that counterfactual thoughts arise frequently in this context.  
 It was hypothesized that potential donors will be more inclined to part with their cash 
if they believe that they themselves might have ended up in the unfortunate situation which 
the victims are presently in. After all, if one believes one could easily be in someone else’s 
shoes, this means that the self and other might be perceived as more interchangeable (Cialdini 
et al., 1997). Donors would certainly want to improve their own situation, and that of those 
close to them. Moreover, similarity to the victims and their experiences impacts on suffering 
imputed to the victims (Nordgren, Banas, & MacDonald, 2011), and one’s own distress on 
their behalf (Wayment, 2004). Both these reactions should increase donation proclivity. 
Indeed, having formerly been in a similar situation as someone in need has been shown to 
increase helping (Li, Li, Decety, & Lee, 2013). If similarity to the victims and their 
experiences enhances helping, then the same can be expected for thoughts that oneself might 
have easily swapped places with the victims. If donors think they might suffer from the same 
misfortunes, they will experience more negative arousal, and will be more likely to help 
victims because they will be motivated by the desire to feel better (Kogut & Ritov, 2011). In 
other words, there is more than one reason why counterfactual thoughts can be expected to 
increase donation proclivity.  
 Under which conditions will people feel that they might themselves have suffered 
from a negative event? Most simply, in order to be directly and personally affected by a 
negative event, one must be in the wrong location at the wrong time. If one is not in the town 
which is struck by an earthquake; if one is not resident in a country ravaged by wildfires, then 
one is very unlikely to be personally affected by said earthquake or the wildfires. Therefore, 
Proximity and disaster giving 5 
at the simplest level, we would expect that being physically proximal to the location where a 
negative event happens increases counterfactual thoughts, which in turn affects donation 
proclivity.  
 Moreover, and important from an applied perspective, it is possible that actual 
proximity to a location is not even necessary. It might be the case that hypothetical proximity, 
in the form of a desire to visit the location – at least before it was struck by disaster – will 
enhance counterfactual thoughts and, through this, donations. In other words, actual 
proximity to a disaster location might not be strictly required, but hypothetical proximity 
might be sufficient for triggering counterfactual thoughts. This idea echoes insights in other 
research areas, such as the positive effect of imagined intergroup contact on intergroup 
attitudes. There, too, has it been found that actual intergroup contact is not necessary; 
imagined (Crisp & Turner, 2009) or vicarious (Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, & Ropp, 
1997) contact is often sufficient to induce attitude change. Supporting evidence also comes 
from the literature on helping more directly: Garcia, Weaver, Moskowitz, and Darley (2002) 
have demonstrated that in order for the bystander effect (Darley & Latane, 1968) to emerge, 
real other people are not necessary, but simply imagining a crowd of others is sufficient. 
Mirroring these findings, it was expected that hypothetical proximity to a location, expressed 
in a desire to visit the location, might increase counterfactual thoughts. If actual proximity 
increases counterfactual thoughts because people feel that they were almost at the wrong 
place at the wrong time, then hypothetical proximity should also increase counterfactual 
thoughts, because a desire to visit a location will also increase the perceived probability of 
finding oneself at the wrong place at the wrong time. After all, the perceived hypothetical 
probability of being in a place one has always wanted to visit will be bigger than the 
perceived hypothetical probability of being in a place one has never wanted to visit.  
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 The goal of this paper was to highlight a further antecedent of helping, in addition to 
those already well-established predictors. One of the most well-studied predictors of helping 
is, no doubt, empathy. Empathy is defined in the Oxford Dictionary as ‘the ability to 
understand and share the feelings of another’. Empathy is a strong predictor of helping 
tendencies, across a whole range of different situations (Batson, 1990; Eisenberg & Miller, 
1987). The purpose of our theorizing was not to replace or question the clearly very important 
effects which have been demonstrated for empathy, but to add a further piece to the puzzle by 
focusing on a different, previously overlooked variable.  
 To sum up, it is hypothesized that proximity to a location where a negative event 
happened will cause counterfactual thoughts whereby potential donors realize that they 
themselves might have suffered from the event if the circumstances had been a bit different. 
This, in turn, is proposed to have a positive effect on donation proclivity. Moreover, actual 
proximity might not be necessary, but hypothetical proximity to a negative event might be 
sufficient to generate donation-inducing counterfactual thoughts (see Figure 1). In short, 
Hypothesis 1 was that actual physical proximity would lead to donation proclivity, and that 
this effect would be mediated by counterfactual thoughts. Hypothesis 2 was that hypothetical 
proximity would also increase donation proclivity, and that this effect would be mediated by 
counterfactual thoughts as well. The hypotheses were tested in five studies, focusing on both 
real-life and fictitious disaster events.  
 
Study 1 
Method. Ninety four participants who reported to be of British nationality volunteered 
to complete a study during a university open day. Data collection was restricted to this event, 
and all participants willing to give up 5 minutes of their time were included. Participants were 
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prospective students and their relations. The mean age was 29.42 years (ranging from 16 to 
73; 71 females).  
 Participants read, in the form of a fake newspaper article, about a fictitious earthquake 
and tsunami in a Caribbean island which was reported to be a popular tourist destination. The 
disaster was said to have caused huge losses in terms of life, and tremendous damage to the 
infrastructure of the country.  
 To measure counterfactual thought, participants responded to the following three 
items (1 = almost impossible to 7 = quite possible): If the circumstances had been a bit 
different, do you think … 1) that you could have been a victim of this event; 2) that you could 
have suffered a loss due to this event; 3) that you could have been impacted negatively by 
this event; α = .89. 
 To measure donation proclivity, participants responded to two items (1 = not at all to 
7 = very much): I would be willing to give a donation to help the victims of this event; I think 
it is important to give a donation to the victims of this event; α = .76.  
 None of the participants reported being suspicious about the veracity of the fictitious 
disaster, or any other aspect of the design. This and all following studies followed APA 
ethical recommendations.  
 Results. As expected, counterfactual thought was positively associated with donation 
proclivity towards the victims, r = .33, p < .001.  
 
Study 2 
Method. This study built on the preliminary findings of study 1 and also included 
proximity. One hundred twenty-two psychology students at a London university participated 
in the study in exchange for course credits. All students in that year cohort were invited to 
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participate (but not all agreed because they had several studies to choose from), and data 
collection was limited to that cohort. The mean age was 20.08 years (109 females).  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions, i.e. whether the event 
they were responding to was purported to have happened in a location close by (i.e. London, 
UK) or far away (i.e. Kabul, Afghanistan). Hence, ‘location’ was a between participants 
factor with two levels.  
All participants were asked to take some time to vividly imagine a potential disaster 
event involving public transport and an explosion, either in London or Kabul. They were told 
that money was being collected to help the victims.  
 To measure counterfactual thought, participants responded to three items very similar 
to the ones for study 1 (1 = low counterfactuals to 7 = high counterfactuals; α = .94).   
 To measure donation proclivity, participants responded to the same two items as for 
study 1, plus one additional one (1 = not at all to 7 = very much): I think it is the right thing 
to do to donate money to help the victims; α = .86.  
Results. To test whether ‘location’ would impact on donation proclivity via 
counterfactual thought, a path model was specified (using Amos 19) with ‘location’ as an 
exogenous variable predicting ‘counterfactual thoughts’, which in turn predicted ‘donations’. 
 The model fitted the data well, χ2 (1) = 1.69, ns; CFI = .97; RMSEA = .07. 
Standardized path coefficients were .31, p < .001 to counterfactual thoughts, and .29, p < .001 
to donations. The R2 for donations was .08. An analysis with 200 bootstraps revealed that the 
indirect effect (.09) was significant, as the 90% confidence interval did not contain zero (CI = 
.17 to .02). Moreover, to ascertain that the proposed model would indeed fit the data better 
than an alternative causal sequence, an alternative model was estimated where donations and 
counterfactual thoughts were swapped around, so that ‘donations’ functioned as mediator, 
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and ‘counterfactual thoughts’ were the ultimate outcome. Yielding further support for the 
predications, this model did not fit the data well, χ2 (1) = 8.84, p < .01; CFI = .63.  
 
Study 3 
 Method. This study aimed to replicate the findings of study 2 for actual proximity. To 
achieve greater experimental control, this time both the location of the participant and the 
location of the disaster were varied.  
One hundred and fifty five participants (mean age 27.08, age range 18-65; 106 
females) who had been approached via social media and a website advertising psychology 
experiments completed the study. The target sample size was at least 30 participants per cell, 
and the sample was closed when checking completion rates revealed that the target had been 
met.  
There were two independent factors with two levels each: participant ‘residence 
location’ (A vs. B), and ‘accident location’ (A vs. B).  
 Participants completed a thought experiment. They imagined that they were currently 
living in location A or B. They were then told that there recently was a tragic disaster in 
either location A or B. After a brief description of this fictitious event, participants completed 
the relevant scales. 
 Three items very similar to those described for previous studies measured 
counterfactual thoughts (1 = low counterfactuals to 7 = high counterfactuals; α = .94). 
 To measure donation proclivity, participants responded to three items similar to those 
previously described, asking for their willingness to donate to the victims of the event (1 = 
not at all to 7 = very much; α = .91).  
Results. An ANOVA was conducted with ‘residence location’ and ‘accident location’ 
as independent variables (IVs), and counterfactual thoughts as the dependent variable. This 
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yielded no significant main effects, and the expected interaction, F (1, 151) = 20.37, p < .001, 
part. Eta2 = .12. Simple contrasts were calculated to interpret the interaction. This revealed 
that an accident in location A led to more counterfactual thoughts when the residence was 
also location A (rather than B), and that an accident in location B led to more counterfactual 
thoughts when the residence was also location B (rather than A) (see Table 1).  
The analysis was repeated but with donations as the dependent variable. This yielded 
no significant main effects, and the expected interaction, F (1, 150) = 6.92, p < .01, part. Eta2 
= .04. Simple contrasts revealed again that as expected counterfactual thoughts were stronger 
when the imagined location of residence and the imagined location of the accident coincided 
(see Table 1).  
To test whether the effect of the interaction on donations was indirect via 
counterfactual thoughts, a structural equation model was built where the interaction between 
the two IVs predicted counterfactual thoughts, which in turn impacted on donations. The 
model fitted the data well, χ2 (1) = .31, ns; CFI = .99; RMSEA = .001. Standardized path 
coefficients were .17, p < .05 to counterfactual thoughts, and .43, p < .001 to donations. The 
R2 for donations was .19. An analysis with 200 bootstraps revealed that the indirect effect 
(.07) was significant, as the 90% confidence interval did not contain zero (CI = .02 to .12). 
Moreover, to ascertain that the proposed model would indeed fit the data better than an 
alternative causal sequence, an alternative model was estimated where donations and 
counterfactual thoughts were again swapped around. Yielding further support for the 
predications, this model did not fit the data well, χ2 (1) = 2.75, p = .09; CFI = .80, RMSEA = 
.11.  
 
Study 4 
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Method. This study aimed to extend the findings of the previous studies from actual 
proximity to hypothetical proximity. A further goal was to demonstrate that counterfactual 
thoughts are clearly distinct from empathy. Two hundred and six Brits participated in a 
survey exchange for course credits. All students in that year cohort were invited to participate 
(during an open day and for course credits), and data collection was limited to that cohort. 
The mean age was 20.35 years (169 females).1  
All participants filled out a questionnaire about a real-life disaster event (either the 
Asian Tsunami of 2004, or the Darfur crisis) which were discussed in the media at the time 
the study was conducted.  
 Participants (none of whom had actually been to the location) indicated whether they 
would ‘have liked to go to the affected area before the disaster happened (e.g. for holiday)’ (1 
= not at all to 7 = very much). This measure captured hypothetical proximity.  
Counterfactual thought was measured with four items very similar to the ones 
described previously (1 = low counterfactuals to 7 = high counterfactuals; α = .91). Donation 
proclivity was measured with five items very similar to the ones described previously (1 = 
low donation proclivity to 7 = high donation proclivity; α = .83). Empathy was measured with 
five items (I feel very concerned for the victims; I feel very compassionate with the victims; I 
have a lot of empathy with the victims; I feel great sympathy for the victims; I feel very sorry 
for the victims; 1 = low empathy to 7 = high empathy; α = .89). 
Results. A factor analysis was conducted with varimax rotation. This extracted two 
items with an Eigenvalue greater than 1. All counterfactual items loaded on one factor 
(loadings ranged from .86 to .91), and all empathy items loaded on a second factor (loadings 
ranged from .77 to .88). The highest cross-loading among the counterfactual items was .19, 
and the highest cross-loading among the empathy items was .20. The factor structure clearly 
suggests that counterfactuals are theoretically and empirically distinct from empathy.  
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A model was specified with ‘hypothetical proximity’ as an exogenous variable 
predicting a latent factor ‘counterfactual thoughts’ (with the four individual items serving as 
indicator to this factor), which in turn predicted a latent factor ‘donations’ (with the five 
individual items serving as indicators). The model fitted the data well. Although – as would 
be expected for large samples - the chi square was significant, the more important fit indices 
confirmed good fit, χ2 (34) = 64.23, p < .001; CFI = .97; RMSEA = .06. Standardized path 
coefficients were .34, p < .001 to counterfactual thoughts, and .36, p < .001 to donations. 
Most importantly, an analysis with 200 bootstraps revealed that the indirect effect (.12) was 
significant, as the 90% confidence interval did not contain zero (CI = .06 to .18).  
Further evidence for the independence of the effects of counterfactual thoughts and 
empathy comes from two regression analyses. In the first one, donations were predicted from 
only counterfactual thoughts (β = .32, p < .001), and in the second one from counterfactual 
thoughts (β = .18, p < .01) and empathy (β = .47, p < .001). The fact that the effects of 
counterfactual thoughts remain significant even when confirming empathy further underline 
their importance.  
 
Study 5 
Method. This study aimed to replicate the findings of study 4 for hypothetical 
proximity; however this time for greater experimental control fictitious rather than real events 
were used. Sixty students at a London university were approached on and around campus and 
participated on a voluntary basis. The aim was for a sample size per cell of 30, and data 
collection was stopped once the target had been reached. The mean age was 26.75 years (38 
females).  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. They were asked to 
think about either an island which was either an attractive or an unattractive travel 
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destination. Hence, manipulating desire to visit the place tapped into ‘hypothetical 
proximity’, which is higher for attractive locations. ‘Hypothetical proximity’ was thus a 
between participants factor with two levels.  
All participants were told about a Caribbean island with beautiful climate and idyllic 
beaches, which had however fallen prey to a recent earthquake and tsunami, causing huge 
losses in terms of live, and tremendous damage. Victims of the event were reported to need 
urgent support.  
Moreover, half the participants were told that the island was a great tourist destination 
with excellent tourist infrastructure, making staying there fun. The other half were told that 
the island was not a good tourist destination due to a total lack of tourist infrastructure, 
making staying there stressful.  
 Following this description were the three items to measure counterfactual thoughts (1 
= low counterfactuals to 7 = high counterfactuals; α = .93). 
 To measure donation proclivity, participants responded to six items asking for their 
willingness to donate to the victims of the event, to the Caribbean victims specifically, and to 
tourist victims specifically (1 = not at all to 7 = very much; α for the total scale = .90).  
Results. To test whether ‘hypothetical proximity’ as manipulated via the vignettes 
would impact on donation proclivity via counterfactual thought, a path model was specified 
with manipulated ‘hypothetical proximity’ as an exogenous variable predicting 
‘counterfactual thoughts’, which in turn predicted ‘donations’. The model fitted the data well, 
χ2 (1) = .22, ns; CFI = .99; RMSEA = .001. Standardized path coefficients were .24, p < .05 
to counterfactual thoughts, and .35, p < .01 to donations. The R2 for donations was .07. An 
analysis with 200 bootstraps revealed that the indirect effect (-.09) was significant, as the 
90% confidence interval did not contain zero (CI = -.21 to -.01).  
General Discussion 
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 At the time of writing, the world is witnessing yet another attack by IS on a European 
capital. European leaders are united in expressing their shock and concern, whilst 
simultaneously not focusing on the numerically much more impressive losses of human life 
in other parts of the world. Indeed, it seems people often dwell on relatively minor events at 
home rather than major disasters abroad. This contribution aimed to explain this disparity, 
and suggest how it might be addressed.  
The findings show that counterfactual thoughts, i.e. potential donors thinking that they 
themselves could have suffered from a disaster if the circumstances had been a bit different, 
are positively associated with donation proclivity. Counterfactual thoughts themselves are in 
turn influenced by how proximal a potential donor is to the physical location where the 
negative event takes place. Moreover, actual proximity is not strictly necessary to induce 
counterfactual thoughts, but hypothetical proximity suffices. The pattern of results was 
consistent across different types of negative events, and for fictitious, imagined and real-life 
events, speaks to the generalizability of the pattern. 
 The findings make an important contribution for two reasons. Firstly, they explain 
why people are often moved to help if the suffering is happening right in front of their eyes, 
yet happily ignore death and suffering in locations far afield. This series of studies 
illuminates the psychological mechanisms behind this paradox, which has long fascinated 
philosophers (Singer, 2009). Secondly, the insight that hypothetical proximity is sufficient for 
triggering donation-inducing counterfactual thoughts has important practical implications. 
While it is clearly not possible to influence whether someone has visited a disaster area 
before the disaster occurred, hypothetical proximity, as well as counterfactual thoughts 
themselves, can be influenced through the design of donation appeals. Getting donors to 
imagine that they might have visited a location, presenting information which make the 
location appear as a more desirable holiday destination, as well as direct instructions to think 
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about how donors might have been victims themselves if the circumstances had been 
different, are all messages with the power to increase donations.  
 There is always room for improvement when conducting research. Future studies 
might, for example, incorporate a behavioral outcome measure. Although it has been found 
that self-reported donation proclivity are highly correlated with actual donations (Bekkers & 
Wiepking, 2011; Zagefka et al., 2011), including a behavioral measure would be interesting. 
Moreover, some (but not all) of the data presented was of correlational nature, which make 
inferences about the causal direction of observed associations difficult. A further limitation is 
that samples were not representative of the general population, to again inferences about the 
generalizability of observed effects can only be made with caution.  
 Of course, counterfactual thoughts are not the only factors influencing donations. A 
variety of variables have been found to influence monetary donations (Evangelidis & Van 
den Bergh, 2013; Hsee, Zhang, Lu, & Xu, 2013; Kogut & Ritov, 2007; Oppenheimer& 
Olivola, 2011) and prosocial behavior more generally (Dovidio, Piliavin, Schroeder, & 
Penner, 2006). Among them are psychological biases (Chandler, Griffin, & Sorensen, 2008; 
Kogut & Beyth-Marom, 2008; Slovic, 2007) and a preference for helping ingroup rather than 
outgroup members (Levine, Prosser, Evans, & Reicher, 2005). The present contribution adds 
one important piece to the puzzle. The previous neglect is surprising, given that – as outlined 
above – this concept seems to harbor the potential to inform simple and cost-effective 
intervention strategies to boost donations to those victims which would otherwise tend to be 
ignored. 
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Footnotes 
 
1. Results from the survey have been reported in Zagefka et al. (2011, study 2); however, 
results previously reported focused on different scales and questions. Thirteen participants of 
the original sample were not considered in the present analyses, because they reported to 
have visited the disaster location in the past, and the present study was interested in 
hypothetical rather than actual proximity. Two missing item scores were replaced with the 
scale midpoint, to enable AMOS to conduct bootstrap analyses. 
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Table 1: The effect of proximity of participant location and accident location, Study 3  
 
  Participant residence location 
  A B  
  Counterfactual thoughts  
Accident 
location 
A  5.47   (1.64) a 4.69   (1.89) b  
B  4.39   (1.79) a 6.11   (1.44) b  
  Donations  
Accident 
location 
A  5.50   (1.27) a 4.93   (1.62) b  
B  5.16   (1.48) a 5.85   (1.54) b  
Note. SDs in parentheses. Means (row-wise) not sharing the same subscript are significantly 
different from each other at at least p < .05, with the exception of the penultimate row, where 
the difference is only marginally significant at p < .09.  
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1 
Counterfactual thoughts mediate the effect of proximity on donation proclivity 
 
Proximity and disaster giving 23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proximity  
(actual or 
hypothetical) 
Counterfactual  
thought 
Donation  
proclivity 
